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THE CUTLER LECTURES

Established at the College of William and Mary
in Virgina by James Goold Cutler
of Rochester, N. Y.
The late James Goold Cutler of Rochester, New
Y or k, in making his generous gift to the endowment of the Marshall-Wythe School of Government and Citizenship in the College of William
and Mary provided, among other things, that one
lecture should be given at the College in each
calendar year by some person "who is an outstanding authority on the Constitution of the
United States." Mr. Cutler wisely said that it
appeared to him that the most useful contribution
he' could make to promote the making of de.mocracy safe for the world (to invert President
Wilson's aphorism) was to promote serious consideration by as many people as possible of certain points fundamental and therefore vital to
.the permanency of constitutional government in
the United States. Mr. Cutler declared as a
basic proposition that our political system breaks
down, when and where it fails, because of the
lack of sound education of the people for whom
and by whom it was intended to be carried on.
Mr. Cutler was one of the few eminently successful business men who took time from his busy
life to study constitutional government. As a

result of his study, he recognized with unusual
clearness the magnitude of our debt to the
makers, interpreters and defenders of the Constitution of the United States.
He was deeply interested in the College of
William and Mary because he was a student of
history and knew what great contributions were
made to the cause of constitutional government
by men who taught and studied here- Wythe and
Randolph, Jefferson and Marshall, Monroe and
Tyler, and a host of others who made this country
great. He, therefore, thought it peculiarly fitting
to endow a chair of government here and to provide for a popular "lecture each year by some
outstanding authority on the Constitution of the
United States."
The third lecturer in the course was Dr. John
Holladay Latane, member of the staff of the
Walter Hines Page School of International Relations of the Johns Hopkins University.

THE CONSTITUTION AND
FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN HOLLADAY LATANE
M emher of th e Staff of th e Walter Hines Page School of
Internation al Relations of the Johns Hopkins
University

In the first lecture on this foundation the Hon.
James M. Beck described the Constitution of the
United States as "a living instrument of government" which is "ever changing to meet the necessities of a changing time and a changing
people." Of no part of the Constitution is this
statement truer than of the rather meagre
clauses containing the grants of power over
foreign relations. These grants, designed to
meet the needs of a small isolated republic which
proposed to stay at home and mind its own
business, have been enlarged by interpretation to
cover the activities of a great world power.
The framers of the Constitution wisely decided
that the conduct of foreign relations was a federal
function and delegated it to the central government. They also decided that it was an executive
function and confided it to the President, subject
to certain checks in accordance with the general
theory of checks and balances which underlies

our constitutional system. The main check upon
the President is the requirement that he must
obtain the consent of two-thirds of the senators
present before ratifying a treaty. This provision
was adopted, as I shall show, to meet a special
situation, and is at the present time a serious
obstacle to the proper functioning of the United
States in the role it is called upon to play in world
politics. The great expansion of executive power
and the efforts of the Senate to exercise control
over foreign policy through the exercise of its
veto power over treaties are the subjects which
I propose to develop in the course of this lecture.
In a federal government, such as ours, the
control of foreign relations is a delegated power
and ,m ust be exercised within constitutional
limits. It is not regarded as an inherent attribute
of sovereigntyJ as in most unitary or highly centralized stat~ In all states having written constitutions, whether federal or unitary, the foreign
relations power is subject to limitations of some
sort. Sucp limitations are usually greater in
federal than in unitary states, and they are
usually greater in federations formed by the
union of pre-existing states, such as ours, than
in federal states created more or less artificially
for the purpose of decentralizing administration,
such as certain of the South American republics.
In most federations the control of foreign affain
[ 6 ]

is intrusted to the central government and denied
to the states, though in some instances, such as
Germany and Switzerland, the member states
retain the right to make treaties, practically
limited, it would seem, to the regulation of
frontier matters. The members of the Germar.
Reich retain the further right of legation, that is:
they may send and receive foreign ministers.
In the Constitution of the United States the
control of foreign relations is delegated to the
federal government and denied to the states.
The grant of this power is not found in anyone
section of the Constitution and when the scattered sections expressly delegating it are collected
the power does not seem altogether adequate,
but under the doctrine of implied powers the
grants of the foreign relations power have proved
to be quite extensive and on the whole sufficient)
Postponing for the moment the powers given to
the President and Senate, we find that articleI,section 8, gives Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations; to define and punish
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas,
and offences against the law of nations; to declare
war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and
make rules concerning captures on land and
water; to maintain and make rules for the government of the army and navy; and to legislate on
the subject of immigration and naturalization.
[ 7 ]

Article I, section 10, declares that, "No State
shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal ;"
lay duties on imports or exports, without the
consent of Congress; and finally, "No State shall,
without the consent of Congress, lay any duty
of tonnage, keep troops, or ships of war in time
of peace, enter into any agreement or compact
with another State, or with a foreign Power, or
engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such
imminent danger as will not admit of delay."
One of the strangest omissions in the Constitution, in view of the subsequent course of American expansion, was the failure to authorize the
acquisition of new territory. Article IV, section
3, provides that,
New States may be admitted by the Congress
into this Union; but no new State shall be formed
or erected within the jurisdiction of any other
State; nor any State be formed by the junction
of two or more States, or parts of States, without
the consent of the legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.
It is evident, I think, that in adopting this section the members of the convention had in mind
the thirteen original states and the Northwest
Territory. President Jefferson, as a strict constructionist, hesitated to annex the vast Louisiana
[ 8 ]

territory without a special constitutional amendment, but he was urged by Livingston and
Monroe to hasten the ratification of the purchase
treaty lest Napoleon should change his mind. So
Jefferson sacrificed his constitutional scruples on
the altar of expediency. It remained for his great
political antagonist John Marshall to find constitutional justification for this and other annexations under the doctrine of implied powers.
In a case involving the validity of the annexation of Florida, Chief Justice Marshall declared:
The Constitution confers absolutely on the
government of the Union the powers of making
war, and of making treaties; consequently the
government possesses the power of acquiring territory either by conquest or by treaty.

If the government has the power to acquire
territory by conquest or by treaty, it would appear to have the power to cede territory as the
result of an unsuccessful war. Fortunately such
a contingency has never arisen. The question
has, however, been discussed on several occasions,
notably in connection with the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, which settled the Maine-New Brunswick boundary dispute by a compromise giving
Great Britain territory claimed by the state of
Maine. During the negotiations the Maine and
l'vl assachusetts legislatures passed resolutions decl aring that no power was delegated to the na[ 9 ]

tional government to cede territory within a state
without its consent. Webster wrote to the governor of Maine:
Although I entertain not the slightest doubt
of the power of the government to settle this
question by compromise as well as in any other
way, I suppose it will not be prudent to stir in
the direction of compromise without the consent
of Maine.
On the promise of Webster to pay to Maine
and Massachusetts the sum of $150,000 each,
plus an equal division of "the disputed territory
fund" which Great Britain was to hand over to
the United States, the commissioners of Maine
and Massachusetts agreed to accept the compromise and their senators voted in favor of the
ratification of the treaty. The peculiar feature
of the transaction was that the agreement to
make these payments was incorporated in the
fifth article of the treaty with Great Britain.
Lord Ashburton at first objected to this stipulation as a matter with which his government had
no concern, but when Webster explained that
this was the only way to insure the votes of
those states in the Senate for ratification he
withdrew his obj ection. Webster later referred
to these payments as bribes to secure ratification.
If the United States should ever be so unfortunate as to be compelled to cede part of the
[ 10 ]

territory of a state as the result of a military
defeat, it is hardly conceivable that the Supreme
Court would declare the treaty making the cession unconstitutional. It would probably regard
it as a political act not subject to judicial review.
The annexation of territory by joint resolution
of the two Houses of Congress is an illustration
of how the Constitution may be stretched by
interpretation. The first case was that of Texas.
Unable to secure the necessary two-thirds vote
in the Senate for the ratification of a treaty of
annexation, President Tyler resorted to a joint
resolution, which requires only a majority vote,
the justification for such a method being that
Texas was to be admitted as a State and that
Congress had the power to admit new states to
the Union. Half a century later when the Senate
refused to ratify a treaty providing for the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, the problem
was again solved by joint resolution based on the
Texas precedent. It was a false analogy, however, for there was no intention of admitting the
Hawaiian Islands to statehood.
When we come to consider the President's
owers over foreign relations we find the express
grants in the Constitution very meagre. Article
II, section 2, makes him the commander-in-chief
of the army and navy. The same section provides that
[ 11 ]

He shall have power, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur ;
and he shall nominate, and,by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments
are not herein otherwise provided for, and which
shall be established by law.
Section 3 contains the very important clause:
"he shall receive ambassadors and other public
ministers." This gives him the sole right to
recognize new governments or new states, or to
withhold recognition.
The President's very extensive powers in the
conduct of foreign relations are, however, not
derived from specific grants, but from the fact
that he is vested with the executive power and
that he is the only channel of communication
between the United States and foreign nations.
The Constitution simply declares that, "The
executive power shall be vested in a President
of the United States of America." It does not
undertake to define the extent of this power,
though it does place limits upon it in certain
cases, as in the making of treaties. J Early in
Washington's administration the question was
raised as to the scope of the President's powers
in foreign relations and Jefferson as Secretary of
[ 12 ]

State was called upon to prepare an opmlOn.
This he did with great care and his conclusion
was as follows:
The transaction of business with foreign nations is executive altogether. It belongs, then,
to the head of that department, except as to such
portions of it as are especially submitted to the
Senate. Exceptions are to be construed strictly.
In this opinion] efferson referred toClhe Senate
as the only check on the executive in the conduct
of foreign relations, but it should not be overlooked that the House of Representatives has
always claimed a share in the treaty-making
power in cases where a treaty requires a money
appropriation for its execution. The Constitution gives Congress the exclusive power to appropriate money:') Does a treaty, constitutionally
negotiated and ratified, which involves a money
payment, constitute an absolute obligation? Our
answers to this question have not always been
consistent. When the French Chamber of Deputies failed to appropriate money for the payments
due under the treaty of 1831 in settlement of the
famous "Spoliation Claims," Secretary of State
Livingston presented the case to the French
government in the following rather emphatic
language:
The government of the United States presumes
r 13 ]

that whenever a treatv has been concluded and
ratified by the ackno~ledged authorities competent for that purpose, an obligation is thereby
imposed upon each and every department of the
government to carry it into complete effect, according to its terms, and that on the performance
of this obligation consists the due observance of
good faith among nations.
President Jackson pushed this case to the point
of an actual rupture of diplomatic relations with
France, but Great Britain acted as mediator and
the French Chamber finally voted the appropriation.
President Jackson and Secretary Livingston
on this occasion took the international point of
view. The House of Representatives, however,
has upon more than one occasion insisted on its
constitutional rights. In 1796 and again in 1871
it resolved that:
When a treaty stipulates regulations on any
of the subjects submitted by the Constitution to
the power of Congress, it must depend for its
execution as to such stipulations on a law or laws
to be passed by Congress; and it is in the constitutional right . and duty of the House of Representatives in all such cases to deliberate on
the expediency or inexpediency of carrying such
treaty into effect and to determine and act
thereon, as in their judgment may be most conducive to the public good.
[ 14 ]

Treaties which require for their execution
legislative action on the part of the member
states of a federation are sometimes signed subject to such action, in which case they are understood to be mere recommendations. For instance, in the treaty of peace of 1783 with England it was agreed that Congress should earnestly
recommend to the legislatures of the respective
states the restoration of the confiscated estates
of Tories. Although the American commissioners warned the British commissioners that the
states would probably not carry out this recommendation, the British government later alleged
the failure of the states to make restitution to the
Tories as one of the reasons for not carrying out
some of its treaty obligations.
The Labor Organization of the League of Nations deals with subjects that lie outside the
range of federal powers and within the competence of local legislation. Foreseeing the difficulties that might arise the framers of the Treaty
of Versailles expressly provided that,
In the case of a federal state whose power to
enter into conventions on labor matters is subj ect
to limitations, its government may treat a draft
convention as a recommendation only.
As a matter of practice conventions drafted
under the auspIces of the Labor Organization
[ 15 ]

which require legislative action are not signed
by the delegates, but are submitted to the states
participating as recommendations. The fact that
labor legislation is a matter of state control in
the United States has caused the Labor Organiza.:.
tion of the League to be very unfavorably regarded in this country.
Treaties limiting the size of navies, such as
those adopted by the Washington Conference
and the London Naval Conference, might be
considered to deprive Congress of its discretionary right "to provide and maintain a navy," but
even if the House of Representatives should pass
an appropriation exceeding the treaty stipulations, it is hardly conceivable that such a measure should pass the Senate wh~ch ratified the
treaty or escape the veto of the President who
negotiated it. It is of course possible that a
Senate whose personnel has changed and a subsequent President might agree to disregard such
a treaty, but this is unlikely because such treaties
are limited to a relatively brief term of years.
The President, who is the sole channel of communication between the United States and foreign nations and whose powers in this connection
are so great, has a dual responsibility. He is
subject, on the one hand, to the limitations of
the national constitution from which he derives
his powers, and, on the other hand, as the rep-

r
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resentative of the nation before the world, he
must recognize his international responsibilities
and act in accordance with the standards of internationallaw. It is difficult at times to reconcile these two points of view. International law
is recognized by the Constitution in the clause
giving Congress the power "to define and punish
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas,
and offences against the Law of Nations," and
our courts, following the precedents of the English courts, have always recognized international
law as a part of the law of the land. As a member
of the family or community of nations we are
bound by the law of nations, although we have
not yet accepted membership in the League of
Nations. Of course if Congress should pass a
law in direct conflict with a rule of international
law our courts and the executive would have to
follow the act of Congress, but John Marshall
at an early period announced the principle, which
the Supreme Court has time and again reiterated,
that, "an act of Congress should never be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains." If Congress deliberately intends to violate a rule of intern ationallaw or a treaty obligation the country must
stand the consequences if the inj ured nation is
strong enough to resent it.
During the hundred and forty-odd years that
[ 17 ]

)

have elapsed since the Constitution was adopted
the control of foreign affairs has become more
and more centered in the hands of the President.
The principal check upon his authority is the
veto power of the Senate in the making of treaties,
which with the important role now played by the
United States in world politics has become a
subject of heated controversy. Many treaties of
a formal character go through the Senate without
serious discussion or opposition, but on a vital
question of foreign policy it is usually impossible
for the President to command the constitutional
two-thirds vote necessary for ratification. He is
thus seriously handicapped in the carrying out
of his policies. As a result of the long term of
service senators can and frequently do ignore
public opinion. For instance, it seems evident
that fof' some time the great majbrity of the
American people have wanted to see the United
States take its place in the World Court, and yet
notwithstanding this fact and the earnest recommendations of two Presidents, whose party had
a large majority in the Senate, that body has
quibbled over technical points of minor significance and refused to lend the great moral support
of the United States to one of the most hopefu l
agencies for the promotion of world peace.
Had the framers of the Constitution required
merely a majority vote of the Senate for ratifica[ 18 ]

tion, or a majority of both the Senate and the
House, propositions which were considered by
the convention, the President would have a sporting chance to carry out his policies. The twothirds requirement was adopted to meet a particular situation. In 1785 John Jay, who was
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had asked the
Congress of the Confederation for authority to
suspend for a term of years, in return for commercial concessions from Spain, the right of
citizens of the United States to navigate the
Mississippi River. The eastern and middle states
voted for Jay's proposal, while the delegates from
the southern states voted solidly against it. The
right to navigate the Mississippi River to the Gulf
was a matter of vital concern to the people of the
south and west, and the vote of the eastern and
middle states to abandon it, even temporarily,
created great indignation. Fortunately Jay was
unable to come to terms with Spain even on the
basis proposed.
When the question of control of the treatymaking power came up in the federal convention
two years later the Mississippi question figured
in the debate and in order to guard against the
possible sacrifice of territory or rights in the
southwest the southern members insisted that no
treaty should be ratified without the consent of
two-thirds of the members of the Senate present.
[ 19 ]

The World War and the peace negotiations at
Paris raised no more difficult or fundamental
question than that of the control of foreign relations under representative or democratic forms
of government. The problem was not confined
to the United States, although there the spectacular fight between the President and the
Senate attracted world-wide attention and had
disastrous results. To the great majority of
Americans the issue was new, because in only
two cases had the Senate ever before discussed
a treaty in open session. The senatorial opposition to the Treaty of Versailles was, therefore, attributed to the alleged autocratic methods
and personal peculiarities of President Wilson.
The public did not know that the Senate's jealousy of the executive in the field of foreign relations was as old as the government itself, that
upon one occasion President Washington went
to the Senate with the project of a treaty in his
hands for the purpose of seeking the constitutional "advice and consent" of that body, that
the Senate referred his communication to a committee and declined to discuss it in his presence,
and that as he left the chamber he muttered in
audible tones that "he would be damned if he
ever went there again."
Anyone who imagines that the contest between
the President and the Senate for the control of
[ 20 ]

foreign policy began with the administration of
Woodrow Wilson would do well to read John
Hay's letters. The contest reached an acute
stage during Roosevelt's first administration over
the compulsory arbitration treaties negotiated by
Hay, which were amended qy the Senate so as
to require . the submission of each case to the
Senate for approval. Roosevelt considered this
as a nullification of the compulsory feature and
refused to ratify the treaties as amended. The
Senate had been aroused by Roosevelt's negotiations with the Dominican Republic, of which
they disapproved. When the treaty providing
for the appointment by the President of a receiver of Dominican customs failed to receive
the consent of the Senate, Roosevelt ignored that
body and carried out his policy of financial supervision under a modus vivendi until the Senate
finally acquiesced and ratified the treaty in
amended form. During the discussion over the
arbitration treaties Secretary Hay expressed his
opinion of the Senate in caustic letters to his
friends. He declared that thirty-four per ceni
of the Senate would "always be found on thr
blackguard side of every question" that came
before them, and that he did not believe that
another important treaty would ever be ratified
by that body, He also said: "A treaty entering
the Senate is like a bull going into the arena:
[ 21 ]

/

no one can say just how or when the final blow
will fall-but one thing is certain-it will never
leave the arena alive."
President Cleveland once referred in characteristic phraseology to "the customary disfigurement which treaties undergo at the hands of the
United States Senate." In fact it has long been
a habit of the Senate to amend treaties or attach
reservations to them, frequently for no other
apparent reason than to assert the authority of
that body or to create the impression that the
executive has bungled matters and that better
results would have been obtained had the Senate
been consulted or had a share in the negotiation.
Since the Spanish War the Senate has gone a
long way toward securing the right to be represented in the negotiation of important treaties
in addition to its right of advice and consent in
the question of ratification. At the close of the
Spanish War President McKinley appointed a
commission of five members, three of whom were
senators, to negotiate a treaty of peace. The
senators were William P. Frye, president pro
tem of the Senate, Cushman K. Davis, chairman
of the foreign relations committee, both Republicans, and George Gray, the leading Democratic
member of the committee. This was regarded
as a shrewd but questionable innovation on the
part of .P resident McKinley. It undoubtedly

r
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enabled him to secure the consent of the Senate
to ratification, but the appointment of senators
as negotiators called forth protests and criticisms. Senator Hoar maintained that the participation of members of the Senate in the negotiation of a treaty would prevent impartial
consideration of that treaty when it came up for
ratification.
In selecting commissioners for the peace conference at Paris President Wilson did not follow
President McKinley's example, and much of the
opposition to the Treaty of Versailles was due
to the fact that the President did not take Senator
Lodge or any of his colleagues to Paris. President Harding reverted to the McKinley precedent and appointed Senator Lodge, chairman of
the foreign relations committee, and Senator
Underwood, the Democratic leader of the Senate,
as members of the delegation to the Washington
Conference of 1922; and President Hoover appointed Senator Reed, Republican, and Senator
Robinson, the Democratic leader, as delegates to
the London Naval Conference of 1930. Both
treaties were promptly ratified.
The Senate advanced another claim in connection with the London Naval Treaty. It demanded that all the correspondence leading up
to the treaty be laid before it. Secretary Stimson replied that all essential information had
[ 23 ]

been transmitted, but that it would seriously
embarrass our relations with other powers to
make public all notes and cablegrams that had
been exchanged.
President Hoover refused,
therefore, to comply with the request of the
Senate. Senator Reed did not help the situation
by assuring his colleagues that as a delegate he
had examined all the correspondence and coul d
vouch that it was all right. This raised the question as to whether one senator was entitled to
more information than his colleagues. If the
Senate should establish as a principle the right
to have all correspondence relating to a treaty
before giving its consent to ratification, it would
gain nothing, for our diplomats would soon learn
not to commit to writing anything relating to a
private or confidential conversation, in which
case the texts of treaties would be submitted with
even less information than the Senate now gets.
In rejecting the Treaty of Versailles the Senate
won what is likely to prove a fruitless victory.
That body, so jealous of its rights, already appears to have been short-circuited. It has kept
us out of the League of Nations, but it has not
kept us out of European politics. The executive
has already found a way of dispensing with its
"advice and consent" by handling delicate and
important matters "unofficially." In order to
win in 1920 the Republican party indiscrimi~ 24 ]

nately repudiated the great achievements of
Woodrow Wilson and proclaimed so loudly a
return to the isolation of the "founding fathers"
that when they assumed the responsibilities of
office they found themselves hampered at every
turn by the reactionary views which they had
disseminated among the people.
Secretary
Hughes extricated himself from this situation to
some extent by the device of sending "observers"
to European conferences and soon built up a
system of "unofficial diplomacy." His part in
the adjustment of the reparations question was
"unofficial," though none the less effective.
Upon several occasions he set forth the advantages of this sort of irregular co-operation
with Europe over membership in the League of
Nations. In an address before the N ew York State
Republican convention in 1924 he said that if
Congress had been asked to authorize executive
action in conferences such as had been taking
place in Europe from time to time, "the Congress
itself most probably would reserve the authority
to give instructions, and you can well imagine
what the debate would be and what the instructions would be."
Just after the London Conference of 1924,
which gave effect to the Dawes Report, Secretary
Hughes, who had visited London, Paris, and
Berlin in the effort to put the Dawes plan

[ 25 ]

through, said before the Society of Pilgrims in
London:
Without wishing to say anything controversial
on this occasion, I may give it as my conviction
that had we attempted to make America's contribution to the recent plan of adjustment a
governmental matter, we should have been involved in a hopeless debate, and there would
have been no adequate action. We should have
been beset with demands, objections, instructions.
However effective this method of procedure
may be, it is anything but democratic. It is in
line with secret, not open, diplomacy.
Wilson and Lloyd George both undertook to
bring foreign relations under democratic control.
It is not yet possible to determine how far they
succeeded. Notwithstanding the ridicule heaped
upon the expression "open covenants openly arrived at," it cannot be denied that a new order
of diplomacy was introduced by the World War.
The main difference between the old diplomacy
and the new is frequently said to be the difference between the transaction of business by professional diplomats in the privacy of chancelleries
and the drafting of agreements at public conferences in the full glare of publicity. This difference is more superficial than real, for experience
has shown that unless the way has been carefully
[ 26 ]

prepared in advance for such conferences, little
is accomplished. What is actually done is usually agreed on beforehand and only the results
announced in plenary sessions. This was true
of the Paris Conference, where all important
questions were determined in private by the Big
Four.
The same general method of procedure was
followed by the Washington Conference of 1922
and the recent London Naval Conference. Indeed it is difficult to see what other procedure
could be followed. Nevertheless the international conference serves to focus public attention
on important questions about which the public
knows little and formulates issues for submission to the final verdict of public opinion. Furthermore it is impossible for the agreements
reached at a conference to be kept secret. As
a matter of fact all secret compacts have been
invalidated by the Covenant of the League, so
that open diplomacy has made great gains. With
the modern machinery of communication and
the various agencies of publicity that now exist
it is inconceivable that the old order should return or that public opinion should ever cease to
be the force that it has become in international
affairs.
The policy of European governments with respect to the publication of foreign office archives
[ 27 ]

and current information has been revolutionized
as a result of the World War. Documents which
under the old regime would have been kept
secret for a generation or more are now available
in print. Strange to say, this demand for publicity in international affairs has so far met with
little response in the United States. Professor
Manley Hudson's report submitted to the Conference of Teachers of International Law in April,
1928, shows that our government supplies less
information to the public on current international affairs than that of any of the great powers.
Mr. Hughes, in commenting on the report, remarked facetiously that a delay of eleven years
in the publication of the last volume of "Foreign
Relations" tended to take the edge off of critiCism.

The requirement of the two-thirds vote in the
ratification of treaties, which gives the veto power
to thirty-four per cent of the senators present,
. is a serious handicap on the executive. In order
to overcome it successive Presidents have developed to an amazing extent the discretionary
powers of the executive under the general doctrine that the conduct of foreign relations is an
executive prerogative. The fact that the President is the sole channel of communication with
foreign nations 'gives him, of course, a great advantage in the development of his powers. It
[ 28 ]

enables him to take the initiative in formulating
foreign policies, and it is worthy of comment
that all of our distinctive foreign policies have
been formulated and announced by Presidents.
The Senate obstructs, but it does not initiate.
The President, as already stated, has an unlimited discretion in the recognition of new governments and new states. In the negotiation of
treaties and in the transaction of other important business he may use special agents, of uncertain diplomatic status, who are appointed and
sent abroad without the consent of the Senate:
President Wilson's employment of Colonel House
as his personal representative in Europe before
and during the World War was not an innovation, though it was the most conspicuous instance
of the kind. H. M. Wriston, in his recent book,
Executive Agents in American Foreign Relations,
shows that Colonel House had over four hundred
predecessors, that all of our Presidents had made
use of special agents appointed without the advice and consent of the Senate. Such temporary
use of special agents does not constitute appointment to office within the meaning of the Constitution, because the courts have held that an
office carries with it the idea of permanency and
must be created by law. Such agents have frequently been given the rank of minister or ambassador, but this does not make them ministers
[ 29 ]

or ambassadors within the meaning of the claust
of the Constitution requiring the advice and
consent of the Senate. Thus when President
Wilson sent Mr. Root at the head of a special
mission to Russia he gave him the rank of ambassador, but did not submit his name to the
Senate, for the appointment was temporary and
did not create an office.
Presidents have frequently made agreements
with other nations of the nature of treaties, but,
under the disguise of some other term, such as
protocol or modus vivendi, have put them into
effect without the consent of the Senate.
Although Congress is given the power to declare war, the President has developed the power
to make war. The war-making power which the
President has gradually taken to himself is derived, according to Professor Corwin (The P r.csident's Control of Foreign R elations, p. 206),
largely from two sources:
First, from the coalescence which took place
at the time of the Civil War between the President's agency in the enforcement of laws and his
power as commander-in-chief of the army and
navy; secondly, from our proximity to weak
disorderly neighbors, who demand rough handling occasionally but are rarely worth a real
war.
The right of the President to land marines or
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other armed forces on foreign soil for the purpose
of protecting the lives and property of American
citizens, to which Professor Corwin has reference
in the passage just quoted, is fortified by a long
line of precedents dating back to an early period
of our history. There are nearly a hundred cases
in which marines have been actually l'anded on
foreign soil in various parts of the world and
many more cases in which they have been dispatched to the scene of disorders but not actually
landed. In most of the cases in which marines
have been landed the local government was in
abeyance or unable to afford protection, but in
recent years the marines have occasionally been
used for political purposes, that is, to support a
government or faction to which the President
had extended recognition. Such was the case in
President Coolidge's intervention in Nicaragua.
Marines were landed at the request of Diaz who
had been recognized by the United States and
they waged war against Sandino and his forces.
It was war de facto, but not war de jure, because
it was not waged against a recognized government and therefore did not require a declaration
of war by Congress. The same was true of the
Archangel expedition against the Bolshevist regime in Russia, in which the United States participated. There was heavy fighting, but no war
in the constitutional or international sense be[ 31 ]

cause the Bolshevist government had not been
recognized.
There is no constitutional check upon the discretionary power of the President in such matters, but the power should be exercised cautiously
and subject to political scrutiny. It would be
perfectly possible for the President to withdraw
recognition from the existing government of a
Caribbean or Central American state, recognize
some claimant to executive power who would be
a mere puppet in the hands of the Department
of State, and with the consent of the government
thus set up land marines for the nominal protection of the lives and property of foreigners, and
crush the opposition. Such a course would be unwarranted political intervention and not mere interposition for the protection of foreign lives and
property. Mr. Hughes undertook at the Havana
Conference to draw this distinction between intervention and interposition, but the distinction is
difficult to maintain in practice. It is always
possible to allege danger to the lives and property
of American citizens as an excuse for landing
marines and the President may go a step furthe r
and back the faction which he considers more
favorable to the enterprises of Americans and
therefore more likely to afford them protection.
The use of armed forces for the protection of
American citizens and their interests abroad has
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not been confined to Latin America. The most
striking instance of the President's assumption
of the war-making power was President McKinley's dispatch of troops to China at the time
of the Boxer uprising. Without any authorization from Congress he ordered over fifteen thousand troops to China. Between five and six
thousand of these arrived in time to participate
in the expedition to Peking for the relief of the
legations. In co-operation with British, French,
Russian, and Japanese contingents they stormed
the walled city of Tientsin and fought their way
to Peking.
The Chinese government was forced to concede
the demands of the powers, which included a
large indemnity and the guarantee of improved
relations, both commercial and political, with
foreigners. These and other demands were embodied in the Protocol of 1901. Strange to say,
this treaty, although published in the official
collection of the treaties of the United States and
still in force, was never submitted to the Senate
for its approval. The only explanation I have
ever heard advanced for the failure of the President to secure the advice and consent of the
Senate to this treaty is that while it imposed
obligations on Chinia, it imposed none on the
United States.
In his first annual message to Congress, in
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December, 1929, President Hoover stated that
we still had 1600 marines in Nicaragua, 700 in
Haiti, and 2605 in China. These are the latest
official figures I have seen.
It will thus be seen that the President has
almost unlimited discretionary powers in the
general conduct of foreign relations. He may
not, however, bind the nation to definite obligations and responsibilities without the consent of
the Senate, and the Senate is exceedingly jealous
of the President's powers and not immediately
responsive to public opinion. How to democratize the Senate, or overcome in some other
way the handicap which the two-thirds requirement places on the President, is a problem for
which no practical solution has so far been proposed. The Senate is not likely to consent to
a constitutional amendment which would in any
way weaken its veto power. It has not been
possible within the limits of this lecture to discuss the highly technical question as to whether'
the treaty-making power, when constitutionally
exercised by the President and Senate, is subject
to constitutional limitations. In view of the fact
that there are no express limitations and that the
Supreme Court has never declared a treaty unconstitutional, the view is sometimes advanced
that the requirement of a two-thirds vote for
ratification is the only safeguard against the
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abuse of the treaty-making power and therefore
should never be dispensed with. To those of us
who wish to see the United States playa dignified
role in world affairs and assume the responsibilities that its position as a world power naturally
involves, the present situation is highly unsatisfactory. The speeches made in the Senate in
recent years in opposition to presidential foreign
policies have too often been appeals not to the
intelligence of fellow senators or to the public
at large, but to the prej udices of particular constituencies. This is one of the inevitable results
of considering treaties in open session.
The United States already holds the balance
of world power in its hands and is actively participating in world politics, however much the
government may attempt to conceal that fact
from the public. But can we continue indefinitely to claim a voice in world affairs unless
we are willing to assume our share of responsibility for the maintenance of world peace? The
Senate is insistent enough on our rights, but
very indifferent to our responsibilities. Can the
nations of Europe, for instance, afford to make
any material reduction in armaments, naval or
military, until they know whether we will permit
them to punish an aggressor, or whether under
the plea of neutral rights we will continue to
trade with a nation which has violated its in-
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ternational obligations? To this question we
have given no answer, because no treaty providing in advance for such a contingency would
stand any chance of being ratified by the Senate.
The Senate moves slowly, but in the long run it
is responsive to public opinion. Hence the only
solution of the problem presented in this lecture
would seem to be the development of a well
informed intelligent public opinion on international questions. This cannot come to pass until
the Department of State adopts a more democratic policy in the matter of publicity. A great
many of the criticisms of the executive in questions of foreign policy are due to lack of full
information. If we believe in democracy and in
popular education, we can look forward as we
gain experience to a more harmonious adjustment of the control of foreign relations.
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